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Abstract: In today’s globalized world, nations are increasingly concerned about
how they are perceived by their publics, often carefully planning and executing
policies to maintain a positive identity or shed a negative image. While some
countries are able to execute nation branding, others are not. Using the Nigerian
experience as a case study, this article shows how the character of a state can
undermine its capacity for successful nation branding. We argue that countries
are judged not just by what they say but also by what they do, and that inherent
contradictions such as sectarian violence, ethnic tension, and corruption underline
Nigeria’s underdevelopment and its reputation at home and abroad. We assess
this trajectory in the context of state fragility and “prebendalization” politics in
a country with a powerful colonial legacy, and suggest a duality of order and
disorder involving formal and informal structures of governance that impinge
significantly on re-branding efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, successive Nigerian governments have engaged in nation
branding aimed principally at shedding the country’s negative image domestically and
internationally. Aside from being the most populous black nation in the world, with
over 160 million people, Nigeria is also generously endowed with oil, gas, and other
natural resources, making it strong ally in global economic relations. It ranks among
the seventh largest oil exporters in the world. However, the hope that the country’s
enormous human and material capital would translate into considerable influence in
international affairs has remained elusive largely because of its negative image.
Nation branding is crucial in the current global order because it enhances public
diplomacy, global socio-economic competitiveness, and soft-power promotion (Ham
& Jun, 2008). The image and reputation of a country can attract both tangible and
intangible benefits, including tourism revenue, investment capital, and foreign aid, and
can boost its cultural and political influence in the global arena. Accordingly, there has
been increasing awareness in recent years that the reputation of a country, city, or
region behaves rather like the brand image of a product or company and is crucial to
its progress and prosperity (Anholt, 1998).
In recognition of this, many countries formulate policies aimed at positively influ-
encing global perceptions in order to realize the economies of scale that accrue from
the production, distribution, and marketing of outputs in the global market. This quest
for global competitiveness underpins China’s Shanghai Expo and its production of
promotional films to boost its international image using domestic cultural revitalization
as a springboard for soft power (Barr, 2012). Also, through careful nation branding,
Spain—which was isolated and poverty-stricken in the Franco era—has emerged as a
modern European democracy and first-choice tourist destination (Gilmore, 2002).
Branding has also made Japan famous for technology, Paris for style, Switzerland for
wealth, and Rio de Janeiro for carnival. Yet, much of Africa is notorious for corruption,
poverty, conflict, disease, and weakness of public institutions.
The Nigerian public space and discourse have been replete with re-branding initia-
tives since the Jaji Declaration by the Obasanjo military government (1975-1979).
Shortly after the Shagari-led civilian interlude, the Buhari/Idiagbon regime (1983-
1985) launched the War against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign. This was followed by
the MAMSER and Not in Our Character initiatives, promoted by the Babangida and
Abacha dictatorships, respectively (1985-1998). The return to civil rule witnessed a
revamping of image laundering in the country as exemplified by the Heart of Africa
and Image Re-branding policies of the Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Yar’Adua (2007-
2010) administrations, respectively. The Image Re-branding project was the most
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comprehensive and expensive nation-branding initiative yet. It had the motto “Nigeria:
Good People, Great Nation” and was aimed at “accelerating Nigeria’s development
through foreign investment and tourism” (Albert, 2009, p. 406).
But despite over three decades of re-branding efforts, Nigeria’s image has remained
“an insignia of dishonest, dishonour, and disrespect” (Bamiduro & Aremu, 2012, 
p. 11). A fervent journalistic blitz to sway public perception has hardly resulted in any
meaningful improvement. Levels of crime and insecurity are high, and corruption
remains endemic—though increasing global insecurity may suggest that crime and
corruption are not peculiar to Nigeria. According to Akunyili (2009a, p. 1), “corrup-
tion and bad behaviour are not only domiciled in Nigeria and Nigerian blood but are
pervasive all around the world.” Indeed, in the United Kingdom, United States, and
Russia, among other western countries, street urchins and gun-carrying youths have
unleashed terror that has claimed several lives in gang wars that leave many bewildered
(Foley, 2009). State responses to step up security and social security measures to abate
the crime have been the norm.
In pursuit of the Image Re-branding project, the Federal Ministry of Information
and Communication requested 320 billion Nigerian naira (N) in 2010, a steep increase
over the N150 million approved for the project in 2009 (N150 is equivalent to about
US$1). Questions were asked about whether the huge sums of money would be used
to “re-brand” some private pockets, as had happened in other programs in the past.
Against the journalistic blitz to correct Nigeria’s image, it is pertinent to ask: what is
responsible for Nigeria’s image collapse? And why have previous rebranding efforts
been ineffective? Grappling with these questions is vital not only to Nigerians and
their governments, who deserve to know why their nation’s image is so negative and
why enormous revenues are spent on ineffective campaigns, but also to other countries
and their citizens, who relate with Nigeria as aid donors, business people, and tourists,
and in other ways.
This article explores the politics underpinning the re-branding project and assesses
it as rhetoric that seems to deny reality. The following sections lay the conceptual and
theoretical groundwork for the analysis, discuss the relevance of re-branding to Nigeria,
summarize the country’s positive and negative characteristics, and then draw conclu-
sions and emphasize the need for structural and attitudinal changes in the country.
CONCEPTUALIZING NATION BRANDING
The term brand can be used in three senses: to describe the designed identity of a
product, to refer to the culture of the organization behind the product, and to approximate
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the product’s or corporation’s reputation in the minds of its target audience (Anholt,
1998). Branding is a tool of marketing in which a new name, term, symbol, design, or
a combination of these is created for a product with the aim of developing “a new
differentiated identity in the minds of consumers, investors, and competitors” (Muzellec
& Lambkin, 2006, p. 803). According to the Committee on Re-branding (2009, p. 1),
a brand is “the totality of consumers’ experience, perception, benefits and values.”
Customers’ perception of a brand matters a great deal to the brand owner. This
explains why a brand image is carefully built, “maintained and positioned” (Stobart,
2002, p. 63).
Though the term brand is often used in relation to products, it has recently been
applied to countries (nation branding), as the Nigerian, Korean, Chinese, and American
re-branding projects demonstrate. Nation branding has been defined as “the strategic
self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating reputation capital through
economic, political and social interest promotion at home and abroad” (Szondi, 2008,
p. 5). This may stem from self-defense, as when a country tells its own story in contra-
diction to foreign media portrayals, definitions by rival nations, or the perpetuation of
national stereotypes (Dinnie, 2008). For example, a Presidential Council on Nation
Branding was established in South Korea in 2009 by President Lee Myung-Bak, who
had taken exceptional interest in improving the international perception of the country.
Also, since the US “War on Terror” response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
name America has become largely circumspect, especially in the Islamic world,
because of an alleged American imposition of its brand of liberal democracy that
many believe is underpinned by the desire for access to oil in Iraq and elsewhere
(Maass, 2009; Keen, 2006). The US image declined during this period, but for a new
re-branding for change signaled by President Barrack Obama.
Nation branding differs from product branding because the parameters for the former
are far more intricate and they take considerable time to manifest. Such parameters
include domestic social, economic, and political well-being. Therefore, re-branding a
nation without proper governance is like putting the cart in front of the “social trans-
formation” horse (Albert, 2009, p. 432). The corporate reputation which re-branding
engenders often enhances, regains, transfers, and/or recreates the corporate brand equity
(Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006). It is often driven by internal and/or external factors.
Nevertheless, it is not a magic formula, because to distil the vastness of a country’s
national identity into something relevant and communicable to distinct audiences is
often very challenging. Whether in nations, organizations, or individuals, reputation
can be observed from behavioral patterns (Bryant, 2005).
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THEORIZING STATE FRAGILITY IN AFRICA
Nigeria’s reputation is at its lowest ebb. Some social critics describe Nigerians in
general terms as criminally minded. For example, former US Defense Secretary Colin
Powell once referred to Nigeria, in reaction to the pervasiveness of Internet fraud in
the country, as “a nation of scammers” (quoted in Glickman, 2005, p. 461). Such
sweeping statements over-generalize, yet there is some truth in what others see as a
few bad apples in the basket. The character and nature of the Nigerian state provide a
vital aperture for a proper understanding of the country’s image crisis.
Scholars have noted that African statehood is not only engrossed in internal conflicts
but is also unable to break free from postcolonial legacies (Collier, 2007; Herbst, 2000;
Reno, 1998). It is widely agreed that the postcolonial state in Africa is fragile and
therefore largely unable to effectively discharge its statutory responsibilities, such as
protecting lives and property and meeting the welfare and development needs of the
people (Osaghae, 2007; Young, 2004). Bifurcated by the colonial situation, African
states were characterized by both centralized and decentralized forms of despotism in
ways that racialist ideology and practice had far-reaching implications for the relations
between citizens and subjects (Mamdani, 2002). Such a legacy of state fragility in
Africa is often attributed to poor institutionalization, which makes public institutions
to thread both formal and informal paths (Joseph, 2002).
The criminalization of African states assumes wider dimensions within colonial
discourse and the character of the states. Since the 1950s, scholars’ attention has focused
on decolonization in relation to ethnicity and conflict involving peace, development, and
governance (Pottier, 2010). In Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the extant postcolonial
states are seen largely as prototypes of the colonial empires which, under the pretense
of development, carted away natural resources to build their empires, thereby initiating
a false start in Africa development (Arrighi, 2002; Dumont, 1988). Colonialism also
brought a new form of political order and its hegemonic economic structure of neoliberal
capitalism and wealth accumulation, which displaced traditional means of governance.
Colonialism helped the “curtailment of communal and individual freedoms” and a
paternalistic reordering of a people’s cultural nexus as a coercive instrument of state
(Nduka, 2006, p. 8). While this suggests “Western ethnocentric arrogance,” yet, the
new elites displaced the colonial masters and took over the reins of nation building but
without letting go of an ingrained colonial mentality (Nduka, 2006, p. 6). Mirroring
the old feudal system in a new political order that promises better life and freedom
became the new vogue at independence.
In Africa, this new culture of modernity and development was built on faulty fissures
of amalgamation of differing nationalities, tribes, and tongues. This cultural collapse
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in the face of culture clash, as in sub-Saharan Africa, remains the challenge of national
unity and nation building. Following the amalgamation of ethnic groups by Lord
Lugard, Nigeria became a colony of the British Empire in 1914 with over 350 ethnic
groups (including Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, Ijaw, and Edo) and 300 languages,
which make ruling and coordination of the various groups for national identity and
development an uphill task. For example, due to ethnic distrust and fear of domination,
Nigerians have no need for a mother tongue lingua franca apart from the language of
the British colonizers. Although some scholars do not see any appreciable link
between “ethnic and religious fractionalization” and conflict (Collier, 2000, p. 108;
Oyefusi, 2008), the case of Nigeria seems to suggest the contrary. Indeed, the more
there are heterogeneous enclaves of diverse people in a country, the more the potential
for sectarian violence and disorder (Svensson, 2007).
It is not surprising that some scholars suggest the criminalization of the African
state in manners that denote “disorder as a political instrument” that maintains the
elites in office (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). True, primordial sentiments such as ethnicity
and religion are manipulated by the elites in pursuit of personal and sectional agendas,
leading to a culture of corruption, patron-clientelism, and prebendalism (De Oliveira,
2007). The term prebendalism was used by Joseph (1987) to denote a form of patron-
clientelism in Nigeria whereby state officeholders appropriate and use public resources
to generate private material benefits for themselves and their constituents. This suggests
that both the formal and informal structures of governance that are inevitably in apposi-
tion nevertheless buoy the system that allows “spoils politics,” insecurity, and corruption
as part of the institutionalized means of governance (Allen, 1999, p. 372; Smith, 2007).
These historical antecedents combined with the challenge of modern statecraft help in
making sense of state fragility and behavior that undermines national integrity and
reputation, which re-branding is meant to address.
As part of the colonial legacy, several African nationalists also mobilized the peo-
ple for independence from the colonialists on the basis of anti-state campaigns. Both
leadership and followership remain problematic in the African state project, though the
pervading practice is to blame only the leaders. The state is not only colonial in nature
but also largely fictional in the minds of citizens. Conceived as an alien institution,
plundering the state for parochial interests was seen as a virtue rather than a vice. Public
service under colonial rule in Igboland was largely externalized as olu oyibo (the white
man’s job) (Osaghae, 2002). Having been internalized, these negative perceptions
remain pervasive and continue to structure and condition the attitude of both rulers and
ruled (Utomi, 2004). Therefore, the continuation of the colonial legacy in Nigeria is
largely a result of governance crisis.
State fragility does not have a generally acceptable characterization. However,
86 Image Re-branding in a Fragile State
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Osaghae (2007, p. 693) itemized the basic features of fragile states thus:
1. Weak, ineffective, and unstable political institutions and bad governance,
conducive to loss of state autonomy; informalization, privatization of state,
personal and exclusionary rule; neo-patrimonialism; and prebendal politics.
2. Inability to exercise effective jurisdiction over its territory, leading to the
recent concept of ungoverned territory.
3. Legitimacy crisis, occasioned by problematic national cohesion, contested
citizenship, violent contestation for state power, perennial challenges to the
validity and viability of the state, and massive loss and exit of citizens through
internal displacement, refugee flows, separatist agitation, civil war, and the
like.
4. Unstable and divided population, suffering from a torn social fabric, minimum
social control, and pervasive strife that encourage exit from rather than loyalty
to the state.
5. Underdeveloped institutions of conflict management and resolution, including
credible judicial structures, which pave the way for recourse to conflict-ridden,
violent, non-systemic and extra-constitutional ways in which to articulate
grievances and seek redress.
6. Pervasive corruption, poverty, and low levels of economic growth and develop-
ment, leading to lack of fiscal capacity to discharge basic functions of statehood,
including, most importantly, obligations to citizens such as protection from
diseases like AIDS and guarantees of overall human security.
To a large extent, Nigeria exemplifies the paradox of the postcolonial state in Africa,
where the relevance of the state diminishes every day. Nigerians carry on as if the state
does not exist—they build their own houses, provide their own private security, build
their own roads, and sink their own boreholes (Amuwo, 2009; Lewis, 2004; Ihonvbere,
1994). These internal contradictions of the Nigerian state with scanty means for 
survival lead to despondency and low morale. The army of unemployed youths takes
advantage of the opportunity for rebellion and violence against the state and other anti-
social behavior such as armed robbery, cultism, and a growing kidnapping enterprise
(Osumah & Aghedo, 2011; Onovo, 2009; Awah, 2009). Hence, for both rulers and
ruled, disorder is more than a “political instrument” that highlights the criminalization
of the state and in ways that allow the formal means of governance to run side by side
with the informal (Bayart, et al. 1999). By assessing these formal and informal means,
the authors make a modest contribution to the literature and in understanding the 
contradictions of re-branding in a weak state in relation to its value system.
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WHY RE-BRANDING IN NIGERIA?
That Nigeria is in dire need of re-branding is not in doubt. It is needed not only to
correct misconceptions about the Nigerian state but to showcase its contributions and
achievements on a global scale. It aims to instill confidence among citizens and present
rebuttal arguments against erroneous claims. The former Minister of Information and
Communication, Professor Dora Akunyili, was the architect of the latest re-branding
project. She has said in various engagements since March 17, 2009, when the project
commenced, that the perception of Nigeria is negative worldwide, as evidenced by the
intimidation of Nigerian green passport holders by most foreign immigration personnel.
While she blamed this on the behavior of a few Nigerians whose activities undermine
the country, she also attributed this image collapse to the negative stereotyping of the
country by some foreign media. Therefore, the internal objectives of the re-branding
campaign are to reconnect Nigerian people with the Nigerian nation; make Nigerians
own and be proud of the Nigerian brand; and re-position Nigeria as a modern, democ-
ratic, disciplined, and accountable nation (Committee on Re-branding, 2009). This
challenging task aims to make every Nigerian the chief advocate of the Nigerian project
through community participation and media re-orientation to project Nigeria in good
light.
Externally, the campaign is aimed at changing negative perceptions of Nigeria
among foreigners and external stakeholders by leveraging the passion of Nigerians in
the diaspora, promoting Nigeria’s economy and tourism to make it globally competitive,
and addressing media imperialism in all its ramifications (Albert, 2009). It is closely
linked with ex-President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s 7-Point Agenda and the achievement
of Vision 20:2020 (Nigeria’s goal to be among the 20 most industrialized nations in the
world by 2020). According to Akunyili (2009b, p. 1), “Nigeria is waiting to be exploited
and developed” by attracting significant foreign investors into the country, which has a
“big market and some of the highest returns on investments found anywhere in the
world. Such calculations also envisage economic growth that will generate employment
and thus “reduce crime and enhance national security” (Ministry of Information, 2009,
p. 1).
A logo with the words “Nigeria: Good People, Great Nation” as symbol for the 
re-branding represented the first achievement for this initiative. As part of its imple-
mentation strategy, re-branding clubs have been established in some Nigerian high
schools and tertiary institutions with a view to inculcating a culture of civility and
patriotism in the students. Nigerian embassies in 105 locations worldwide have also
been used for the project, because they represent windows through which the country
is perceived. In a globalized world, events in Nigeria and elsewhere can no longer be
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hidden from the eyes of the international community (Scott, 2009).
The campaign also involves state governors, ministers, members of the National
Assembly, and ordinary Nigerians who participate in the program through town hall
meetings so that they would represent and obtain feedback on government activities.
Members of Nollywood (the booming Nigerian home-video industry) have also been
wooed to join the re-branding effort because the film-making industry enjoys consid-
erable patronage in Africa and other parts of the world and is seen as possessing the
potential to effect social change. Furthermore, several thousands of the National Youth
Service Corps members engaged in volunteering social work have been deployed in
the implementation of the project (Alao, 2009). Such partnerships with some ministries
and institutions are strategic. For example, while the partnering with the National
Youth Service Corps is to utilize the over 300,000 graduate corps members spread
across the country; the Ministry of Education is targeted to facilitate the establishing of
re-branding clubs in schools as part of civic studies in the educational curriculum.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigerian embassies abroad, and foreign embassies
in Nigeria are targeted by re-branding campaign managers so that the ambassadors
could drive the messages to their various countries and to engage over 17 million
Nigerians in the diaspora in the campaign. According to Akunyili (2009b, p. 6), the
campaign would take the following form:
production and placement of bill boards in strategic locations around the country
and outside; the production of collateral package for the re-branding campaign
such as T-shirts, face caps, table clocks, mugs, crests, umbrellas; production of
different literature on Nigeria that will impact on a positive image; the production
of audio visuals such as radio jingles, TV commercials and their placements in
the media, locally and internationally; logistic support for the series of town hall
meetings in all states of the federation; media package support for comprehensive
coverage and interventions. . . . We will put up outdoor bill boards in the capital
cities of every state, the airports, border towns and other strategic locations in
Nigeria; we will set up dynamic websites that will have important and current
information about Nigeria; we will identify and use brand icons, individuals that
have excelled in their professional fields; we will use institutions like banks and
other businesses that have performed creditably as models and brands; and we
will showcase our strengths, build upon our areas of success and work on those
areas in which the country has clearly failed to perform.
In addition to changing the perception of Nigerians and the international community,
the initiative is expected to also re-brand some critical state institutions whose perfor-
mance could make or mar the image of the nation, including the police force, the civil
service, the political leadership, schools and colleges, the rank and file of labor, the
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corporate sector, religious and social institutions, the immigrations and customs service,
and all other “reformable institutions whose woeful performances have led the Nigerian
people down the path of regrets and aborted dreams” (Akunyili, 2009a, p. 5).
SHOWCASING THE GOOD AND BEAUTIFUL
Not every fiber of social life in Nigeria is up for re-branding. Not only has the
nation achieved some enviable feats, but some individual Nigerians have reached the
pinnacle of their professions at the international level. One strategy of the re-branding
effort has been to showcase these stories of significant successes.
Nigerians are said to have good survival instincts, to love life, and to be good fol-
lowers and imitators, be it for good or bad. The name Nigeria is well known world-
wide—notably, for its prowess in soccer, having won the Under 17 World Cup in
1985, 1993, and 2007. The country also won the under-23 Olympic Soccer Gold in
1996. Soccer has become a unifying force that cuts across ethnicity and religion, and
Nigeria has contributed enormously to global football development.
Nigeria’s contributions to United Nations peacekeeping initiatives and the subsequent
decorations of Nigerian officers for meritorious service are arguably second to none.
The country’s peacekeepers have been sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chad, Lebanon,
Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and other global hotspots (Okolie,
2010). Between 1960 and 2010, the country committed over 250,000 men and women
to support UN peacekeeping operations, “losing 2,000 troops in the process and
expending $10 billion” in spite of its lean resources (Reviewing Nigeria’s role, 2010).
This has made Nigeria the fourth largest contributor of troops to the United Nations
since 1960. As a result, the United Nations has designated the country as a training
center for international peacekeeping troops.
Perhaps individual achievements dwarf any national successes, although individuals
make up nations. The people of Nigeria, the most populous African nation with emerging
markets, are said to be resourceful and enterprising. A Nigerian, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,
served at the top of the World Bank hierarchy as vice president. Several Nigerians
both at home and in the diaspora are excelling in their various professions including
Wole Soyinka, who became the first black African Nobel laureate for literature in 1986;
Chinua Achebe, another literary icon and author of the legendary novel Things Fall
Apart, whose protagonist Okonkwo has become a household name in most parts of the
world; Booker Prize winner Ben Okri; the recent rave of the literary world Adichie
Ngozi Chimamanda; former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations
Emeka Anyoku; businessman Adebayo Ogunlesi, who recently acquired London
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Gatwick Airport; Victor Oladokun of the Christian Broadcasting Network; and the
US-based computer wizard Philip Emeagwali, to name but a few. These achievers
show that Nigeria is not all a gory picture of crime and violence but also of creativity,
skills, and enduring legacies of universal acclaim.
The Nigerian state through the re-branding project thus subscribes to emulating the
exemplary feats of these achievers, if but to stem its poor image. Aside from human
endowment, Nigeria is a force to reckon with in global energy because, as a major oil
producer, it is first in Africa and a leading member of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, with a daily production of over two million barrels of oil. In 2007
alone, it supplied “12 percent of total US crude imports” and also supplied destinations
in Europe, making it a reliable partner to them (Watts, 2007, p. 638).
CHALLENGES OF IMAGE RE-BRANDING IN A FRAGILE STATE
In spite of the success stories described in the previous section, negative trends
and crimes attributed to Nigerians have earned the nation a poor image. However, the
challenge of re-branding is neither new in Nigeria nor exclusive to it. For example,
under British New Labour project, spin doctoring and political sloganeering led to the
elevation of governmental “image over substance” in a bid to counter right-wing media
criticisms of the Labour Party (Scammell, 1995, p. 4; see also Moloney, 2000). Chile
and Angola have also re-branded themselves in a post-conflict era to take advantage of
socio-economic restructuring. In such cases, efforts to address the fundamental problems
are building blocks for re-branding. Critics of the Nigerian re-branding project have
argued that it fails to diagnose and address the root causes of the country’s image 
collapse and seems to focus on treatment of the symptoms rather than the disease.
Re-branding as a response to the armed conflicts over resources in the Niger Delta
is limited. Tribal claims to resource ownership are unlikely to respond to the politics
of re-branding. That aside, its geo-strategic importance in global energy calculations,
and oil revenues that account for about 80 percent of Nigerian government funds, have
not resulted in provision of social services for citizens (Aghedo, 2013). Regrettably,
the politics spawned by oil wealth imbues the country with the corrosive features of
rentierism and the resource curse, such as elite primitive accumulation and its associated
political instability (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009). National average income has been put at
about $1 a day and “a fifth of children die before their fifth birthday” (Peel, 2005, p. 2),
despite the realization of over $300 billion in oil revenues between 1975 and 2004. To
the victims of state failure in the face of inadequate social services, re-branding is an
exercise in futility.
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More structurally, a major source of Nigerian image collapse is political corruption.
As admitted by Akunyili (2009c, p. 1), “right now, the perception of what we have as
a brand is a corruption brand, a near collapse state brand, a dysfunctional people brand
and a brand that is hard to sell.” Since the colonial era, the organization and manage-
ment of state power have largely been driven by parochial agendas of the ruling elite,
often at the expense of citizens’ welfare. Although it has been observed that oil-rich
countries are prone to war, allegations of corruption during the First Republic were
partly responsible for the emergence of the first military coup in 1966, only six years
after independence (Osumah, 2013).
The first phase of military rule was vitiated by numerous corruption scandals. For
example, an inquiry set up after Gowon’s removal from office showed that of Gowon’s
12 military governors, only two were innocent of “illegal self enrichment” (Falola &
Heaton, 2008, p. 187). Despite the purge of the public service through the Jaji Declara-
tion aimed at changing the attitude of Nigerians to ensure self-discipline, patriotism, and
national cohesion, corruption remained rife. This generalized rot and gross indiscipline
were partly responsible for the second military takeover of political power and the
introduction of the War against Indiscipline (WAI) by the Buhari/Idiagbon regime.
The implementation of the WAI re-orientation policy was far more popular but resulted
in the diminution of citizens’ human rights. Horsetail whips (known locally as koboko)
were used indiscriminately by members of the state armed forces to flog citizens to
enforce compliance. Despite gross human rights abuses, the WAI policy was perceived
to have achieved some level of cohesion by coercion.
Under the Babangida dictatorship, the concentration of powers gave rise to
unprecedented corruption. Even debt rescheduling, servicing, foreign aid, and transition
to civil rule were manipulated for self-enrichment (Lewis, 1996). The administration
was noted for corruption and yet to account for up to $12.2 billion of oil Gulf War
windfall (Amuwo, 2009). These were further deepened by his successor, General
Abacha, noted to have looted over US$4 billion from the state treasury; investigations
after his death traced the booty to about 130 banks worldwide (Harnischfeger,
2008).These regimes laid claims to discipline and value re-orientation. However, these
programs were largely “admonitory and mobilisatory” (Osaghae, 2002, p. 21). They
became conduits for siphoning public funds for private use that widened the gap
between the state and citizens. According to Akunyili (2009a, p. 1), past re-branding
efforts “ended at the mere level of intentions, except of course for the WAI,” and most
past efforts were a “financial jamboree” characterized by “squandering of funds.”
The Heart of Africa project, which was launched in 2004 under the direction of
then Minister of Information Chukwuemeka Chikelu, was a spending spree. Various
road shows were organized across Europe and America. The first phase was launched
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in Washington, DC in 2006, the second in Atlanta, Georgia and Houston, Texas, in
2007, and the launch was shifted to Paris later in 2007. The image laundering project
cost over N1billion (Albert, 2009). A large amount of the money was spent on foreign
trips, concerts, consultancies, public relations, and radio and TV commercials to sway
public opinion in favor of Nigeria.
The rhetoric of re-branding in Nigeria does not take cognizance of the reality.
Rather than stemming the tide, the return to democratic rule since 1999 has led to what
is seen by some as the “democratization of corruption” (Eberlein, 2006; see also
Osumah, 2013). Several key officers of the state have been indicted for corrupt practices,
but only a negligible few have been sanctioned. State governors who have recently
been convicted of corruption and money laundering include former Edo State governor
Lucky Igbinedion, his Plateau State counterpart Joshua Dariye, former Bayelsa State
governor Diepriye Alamieyeseigha, and previous Delta State governor James Ibori,
who was acquitted in Nigeria but later convicted and jailed in the United Kingdom
(Tonwe, Ojo, & Aghedo, 2012). According to the Economic and Financial Crime
Commission, of the 36 governors who held office between 1999 and 2007, only five
were free of corruption and money laundering charges; that was similar to the military
era (Oyebode, 2009).
Though corruption is domestically driven, its international dimension in Nigeria is
evident. A case in point is the Halliburton scandal, in which the company subsidiary
KBR admitted bribing key Nigerian government officials in order to facilitate the
award of a US$6 billion Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas construction contract. About
$150 million in bribes to Nigerians has been traced to an unnamed bank account in
Zurich, Switzerland. KBR has since been investigated, convicted and fined $589m in
the United States (Halliburton: $150m, 2009). However, despite the fact that Nigerians
who perpetrated the crime are already well known, the state has not been able to press
charges against them because the list included three former heads of state and other
“big men” (see Table 1). This culture of impunity makes nonsense of any re-branding
or anti-graft stance.
A culture of corruption has been entrenched in which public perception of the state
as belonging to no one in particular is widespread. This lends credence to the thriving
informal structures. As a result, there is more concern about competing for the “national
cake” than about how to increase it. Despite Nigeria’s bid to use re-branding to attract
foreign investment, the illicit capital outflow from the country is monumental. Recently,
Washington-based Global Financial Integrity reported that between 1970 and 2008,
illicit capital outflow from Nigeria and some other African states was $854bn (about
N128.27trn); Nigeria led other countries with $89.5bn followed by Egypt ($70.5bn).
Illicit outflows from the region outpaced official development assistance into the
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region by a ratio of 2 to 1 (Shobiye, 2010). The situation is so pervasive that even 
relatives and clients of those in powerful positions pressure them to enrich themselves
illegally so that the wealth will trickle down to the relatives and clients in a moral
economy of reciprocity and neo-patrimonialism (Joseph, 1987; see also Okecha,
2009). A corruption-normalizing nomenclature has thus emerged. Nigerians discuss
“corruption openly, disdain it and yet indulge in it” (Smith, 2007). At the same time,
corruption when revealed is sometimes met with heavy condemnation.
Economically, the merchants of re-branding face a Herculean task. Dependence on
oil rents has vitiated the economy and hindered a people-centered development. The
rentier mentality has practically made the ordinary Nigerians to be at the service of the
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Table 1. Alleged Payments in the Halliburton Bribery Scandal
Year Alleged amount (US$) Suspected beneficiary
1994-1995 40,000,000 Gen. Sani Abacha
1996-1998 2,500,000 Chief Dan Etete
1996-1998 75,000 M.D. Yusuf
March/June 1998 1,120,000 Grety Overseas UKRiser Brothers
1998 1,887,000 Abulkadir Abacha
1999-2000 37,500,000 Gen. Abdulsalami AbubakarChief Don Etiebet
March 1999 600,000 Prince N.A. BayeroGlosmer Int. (Risers Brothers)
March 1999 290,000 Edith Unuigbe
March 1999 600,000 Zertasha MalikGrety Overseas (Risers Brothers)
1999-2000 195,000 Messr Shinkafi and AliyuGlosmer Int. (Risers Brothers)
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo
2001-2002 74,000,000 Atiku AbubakarGaius Obaseki
Funsho Kupolokun
2001-2002 5,000,000 Bodunde Adeyanju
Ibrahim Aliyu
2001-2002 11,700,000 Urban Shelter
Intercellular
2001-2002 3,108,675 M.G. Bakare
Total 178,575,675
Source: Ajaero (2010, p. 42).
economy as the politico-military power elite manipulates neo-liberal agendas and pro-
grams (Amuwo, 2009). The huge sums realized from the country’s rich natural resources
have “brought about increasing poverty, widening inequality, vast unemployment, a
loss of agricultural self-sufficiency, little growth in manufacturing capacity, waste, and
malfeasance” (Rotberg, 2004, p. 9). Table 2 summarizes rising poverty trends across
the country, especially in the troubled northern region.
Simon Anholt, a UK-based expert, in his 2008 national brand index, ranked Nigeria
49th out of 50 measured against exports, governance, culture, people and tourism,
immigration and investments (cited in Akunyili, 2009b). The World Bank rated Nigeria
125th out of 183 economies in its 2010 Doing Business Report (Realities of Vision
20:2020, 2010). The apparatus of governance for the delivery of order and peace as
well as development have largely been run aground, leaving the elite to misappropriate
public funds, which has inevitably spurred a wave of insurgency (Harnischfeger,
2008).
In the energy sector, demand outstrips supply. The hope of a strong energy sector
to at least equate supply with demand by 2009 did not materialize. The promise of the
Yar’Adua administration to increase the country’s electricity generation capacity from
about 3,000 megawatts to 6,000 in 2009 could not be achieved despite the investment
of over N2 billion (Electricity generation, 2009). The energy sector deserves to be
considered a national emergency as less than 40 percent of 140 million Nigerians have
access to electricity; there is an installed capacity of only 6,113 MW and a demand for
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Table 2. Poverty by Region, Nigeria
1980 1985 1992 1996 2004 2010
Nationwide 28.1 46.3 42.7 65.6 54.4 69
Sector
Urban 17.2 37.8 37.5 58.2 43.2 61.8
Rural 28.3 51.4 66.0 69.3 63.3 73.2
Geopolitical zone
South-south 13.2 45.7 40.8 58.2 35.1 63.8
South-east 12.9 30.4 41.0 53.5 26.7 67
South-west 13.4 38.6 43.1 60.9 43.0 59.1
North-central 32.2 50.8 46.0 64.7 67.0 67.5
North-east 35.6 54.9 54.0 70.1 72.2 76.3
North-west 37.7 52.1 36.5 77.2 71.2 77.7
Source: British Council (2012, p. 10).
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Table 3. Teacher Shortages around the World
Teaching Teaching Absolute Average Total 
Country staff staff needed change annual recruitment 
in 2009 in 2015 in stock change (%) including attrition
Bermuda 600 700 100 3.88 300
Burkina Faso 39,000 85,200 46,200 13.92 62,800
Cameroon 72,300 91,000 18,700 3.90 42,600
Central African Republic 6,400 20,100 13,700 20.97 17,000
Chad 27,400 59,600 32,200 13.80 43,800
Code d’Ivoire 56,600 99,300 42,700 9.83 64,400
Congo 10,400 17,200 6,800 8.68 10,600
Democratic Republic of the Congo 274,500 3,722,000 97,700 5.21 191,500
Djibouti 1,600 3,200 1,600 12.03 2,200
Equatorial Guinea 3,400 5,100 1,700 6.94 2,900
Eritrea 7,800 21,500 13,700 18.43 17,400
Ethiopia 234,200 379,400 145,200 8.37 231,900
Gambia 6,400 8,400 200 4.64 4,200
Guinea 31,800 48,400 16,600 7.25 28,000
Liberia 22,300 30,900 8,700 5.64 16,400
Mali 38,400 62,800 24,400 8.55 38,700
Mozambique 82,800 130,700 48,000 7.92 78,300
Niger 40,000 86,100 46,100 13.62 63,000
Nigeria 466,800 688,200 221,400 6.68 387,000
Occupied Palestinian Territories 14,100 20,000 5,800 5.92 10,700
Pakistan 465,300 605,700 140,300 4.49 296,600
Rwanda 33,200 48,700 15,500 6.61 27,300
Senegal 47,700 67,500 19,800 5.97 36,500
Serbia 17,400 28,600 11,100 8.58 17,600
Sudan 123,600 179,400 55,800 6.40 99,300
Uganda 168,400 218,100 49,700 4.40 106,100
United Republic of Tanzania 157,200 248,600 91,400 7.94 149,000
Zambia 48,100 75,300 27,200 7.77 44,800
Source: Global teacher shortage (2011, p. 3).
over 10,000 MW (Ojo & Idehen, 2011; Okhonmina, 2009; Tallapragad, Pattilo, &
Adebusuyi, 2008). Similarly, over US$8 billion has been spent on the Ajaokuta Steel
Company without a single steel product resulting (Maier, 2000). The dream of the
nation at 50 being one of the 20 strongest global industrial economies, as expressed in
Nigeria’s Vision 20:2020 appears to have suffered a major setback. The inability to
deliver on energy promises is seen by citizens as a metaphor for government’s failure.
Some social writers related a general sense of helplessness from insecurity and the
perennial electricity crisis that have resulted in low productivity from unemployment,
bankruptcy, or the relocation of hundreds of firms involved in production and services
to other African states such as Ghana, Benin, Togo, and South Africa (Ojo & Idehen,
2011).
Even the educational sector has not been spared from the dire consequences of Nigerian
state fragility. The university system, which was highly rated in the Commonwealth of
Nations until the 1970s and 1980s, has become a citadel of “education without learning,”
owing largely to poor funding and incessant strikes. For example, all public universities
in the country were shut down for nearly four months in 2009 as a result of a strike by
the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities and other unions in response to the
government’s failure to keep to the agreement it earlier entered with the unions regarding
pay and conditions of service. Many poorer African countries have better educational
indices than Nigeria because of the acute shortage of teachers (see Table 3).
Disorder and violence are present in every part of Nigeria, and though the motives
seem to differ, they are often related to politics and economics. The fragility of public
institutions involving the state security apparatus makes political manipulation of 
primordial cleavages and sentiments profitable to “entrepreneurs of violence,” leading
the country to be characterized by a history of conflicts which often employ ethnicity
and religion as a smokescreen for personal interests. In northern Nigeria, dominated
by the Hausa and Fulani, from the Maitatsine riot of 1982 through the sharia conflicts
of the 1990s to the Boko Haram, which emerged in 2012 as the second deadliest terror
group in the world after Afghanistan’s Taliban, and the recent Jos crisis, which has
claimed over 3,000 lives, the volatile mixture of politicized religion and ethnicity con-
tinues to wreak havoc on lives and property, developments that re-branding fails to
contend with (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). Between 1999 and 2002, sectarian violence
orchestrated largely by youths in northern Nigeria resulted in the loss of over 8,000 lives
(Reno, 2004). Some Nigerians subscribe to the re-branding motto, yet the occasional
negative interjections as in the cases of the Jos crisis from the middle belt, and the
Ijebu-Ife violence that resulted in the death of hundreds of people in January 2010, are
bad news occurring at regular intervals that portray Nigeria as a victim of incoherent
governance.
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Besides the secessionist Biafran War of 1967-1970 by the Igbo tribe in the east,
social conflict organized by ethnic militias such as the Bakassi Boys, and the Movement
for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra has remained a hallmark of eastern
Nigeria (Aghedo, 2011). There is an elision of this sort of self-determination found in
the Niger Delta region, where agitation for resource control and self-determination by
oil-bearing ethnic minorities in southern Nigeria have led to a “petro-insurgency” and
criminal violence by both state forces and youth militias (Watts, 2007). A cartel has
been implicated in fuelling this youth rebellion and low-intensity conflict. It is alleged
that the people who run the oil bunkering cartel are among Nigeria’s top political
“godfathers”—hence the inability to bring them to justice, which could lead the country
into another civil war because of the huge political and economic influence they
wield: the “industry makes up to £30m ($60m) a day” (Nigeria, 2008, p. 17613).
Western Nigeria, dominated by the Yorubas, is not spared ethno-religious and political
instability, as shown by the perennial Ife-Modakeke conflict, the June 12, 1993 uprising,
and the Oodua People’s Congress crisis, among others (Ukeje & Adebanwi, 2008).
Some of these communal rivalries date back to the 1800s, yet they still assume violent
dimensions and find expression in daily living. On Christmas 2009, the Muslim funda-
mentalist Abdul Farouk Abdulmutallab further soiled Nigeria’s image abroad when he
attempted to blow up an American airliner over Detroit. With this sensational entry of
a Nigerian into the international terrorist scene, the re-branding project became even
more difficult.
Nigeria’s growing insecurity is exacerbated by easy access to light weapons. In
addition to entering through the country’s porous borders, weapons also disappear
from the state’s armory from time to time, and soldiers who served in peacekeeping
operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia are reported to have “brought back large quan-
tities of pistols and AK rifles bought at very ridiculous rates from rebels to sell at very
high prices in Nigeria” (Reno, 2004, p. 234). These weapons often find their way into
the hands of conflict perpetrators who use them to wreak havoc. For example, as many
as 74,064 cases of murder, manslaughter, suicide, and rape were recorded in Nigeria in
two years alone, according to a police estimate (Nigeria records, 2010). The security crisis
in Nigeria is fuelled by large-scale corruption within the internal security apparatus,
especially the police force, which is poorly funded, trained, and equipped (Osumah &
Aghedo, 2010).
These cases of institutional decay plus the high level of unemployment have a serious
negative impact on the people. Poverty and human rights violations resulting from
state’s inability to discharge its responsibilities to the citizenry have been cited as some
of the major drivers of illegal immigration and human trafficking in the country (Awah,
2009). The UK High Commission in Nigeria recently donated a fraud-detection
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machine and other items to the special Fraud Unit of the Nigeria Police Force to help
the police tackle forgery in visa applications. Already, the Commission has meted
derogatory and unilateral punishment in an effort to place a 10-year ban on applicants
who submit forged documents. In the last quarter of 2009, over 15,000 Nigerian
youths were repatriated for various offences, mainly violation of immigration laws
(UK deports 400, 2009). Some desperate Nigerian youths resort to criminality as a
survival strategy, which has complicated the poor image of the country.
For several years, Nigeria has remained a source, transit area, and destination for
human trafficking despite efforts by the United Nations, European Union (EU), and
International Labour Organization to stem the tide. One such effort was the re-launch
of anti-trafficking cooperation between these groups and Nigeria on June 29, 2010 in
Abuja. This project is funded by a N220 million ($1.2 million) grant from the EU.
According to the head of the EU delegation in Nigeria, it is hoped that the project
“will contribute to the fight against trafficking of human beings from Nigeria to
Europe by improving prosecution, protection and re-integration of victims of trafficking
as well as prevention of this phenomenon” (Obayuwana, 2010, p. 80). Though these
anti-trafficking efforts have resulted in the re-classification of Nigeria as a Tier 1 country,
the International Labour Organization has estimated that of the 12.3 million people
globally trafficked into forced labor, 660,000 of them are in sub-Saharan Africa, over
130,000 are trafficked within the continent, and Nigeria is one of the highest contributors
(Obayuwana, 2010; Akpomera, 2009).
Perhaps the scourge of the effort to promote Nigeria’s good name is the notorious
“advance fee fraud.” Some of the country’s criminal networks have acquired global
notoriety in areas beyond oil bunkering including human and drug trafficking and
Internet fraud (Bach, 2004). According to a US Secret Service estimate, Nigerian
Internet scams (known locally as 419) yield their perpetrators several million dollars
yearly, and the losses the United States incurred as result of these scams amounted to
$5 billion in the 1990s (Smith, 2007; Zook, 2007; Glickman, 2005). This figure may
have since trebled.
The great expectations of the people that these social ills would abate with Nigeria’s
return to democracy have nearly been dashed owing to bad governance. The do-or-die
politics of the power elite has given rise to pseudo democracy in which criminal tactics
are deployed to win elective positions. Between 2007 and 2010, 12 governors were
removed from office by the judiciary for election fraud. The 2007 general elections
provoked over 7,000 petitions, and several of these petitions were still pending in
court three months before the general election four years later (Graft, 2010). This
“mandate theft” (Abutudu & Obakhedo, 2009, p. 235) infuriates the masses and
makes nonsense of Nigeria’s claim to democratization and the rule of law, yet it is not
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addressed by the advocates of re-branding.
These internal contradictions are also not helped by the politics of the international
mass media, which compounds Nigeria’s image crisis. For several years, Nigeria has
been demonized internationally, and clashes manipulated between southern and northern
Nigeria. For example, a foreign news agency tried to manipulate the Organization of
Islamic Conference crisis in order to cause a civil war in Nigeria (Kukah, 2007, p. 14).
The international conspiracy against Nigeria has been well noted. For example, former
UN Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali once remarked that he had “never
seen a country as lied against as Nigeria” (cited in Kukah, 2007, p. 15).
This international calumny has been going on for years. The British media coverage
of the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war was so biased that a critical study at the time con-
cluded that it “was not an honourable era in British journalism: the news was often
incorrect and misleading” (Akinyemi, 1972, p. 424). International media politics
sways public opinion against African countries. In a recent survey, Lader (2007, p. 3)
found that newspapers are the core source of information for 47% of UK citizens.
Another study showed that “80% of the British public strongly associates the developing
world with doom-laden images of famine, disaster and Western aid” (VSO, 2001, p. 3).
A study of the US media also concluded that the coverage of Africa is “one-dimensional
. . . relies on stereotypes . . . lacks sufficient context [and is] predominantly negative in
context” (Wall, 2007, p. 162, cited in Scott, 2009, p. 533).
Nigeria is poorly portrayed even in movies. One example is The Informant, a
movie about the Archer Daniels Midland fraud case, in which the main character was
duped by a Nigerian advanced-fee fraud. Also, Nigeria’s image was not helped in two
recent American television series, The Philanthropist (filmed mainly in South Africa)
and Castle, in which the country was ridiculed as a nation of kidnappers and voodoo
worshippers, respectively (For a similar but scholarly treatment of the effect of voodoo
on Nigerian image, see Dijk, 2001). Although re-branding strives to counter these 
negative perceptions, how it intends to pursue this goal beyond putting up billboards is
yet to be seen, as bad news from international media outlets and governments continues
to go unchallenged.
International media politics notwithstanding, Nigeria’s image crisis is largely self-
inflicted. In a globalized world, events in one area will inevitably be reported to the rest
of the world. Obviously, the state is unable to discharge many of its statutory functions,
including ensuring order, guaranteeing welfare, minimizing corruption, and regulating
people’s usage of criminality as a survival strategy, thereby exposing the state to unfa-
vorable media reports. The implication of these contradictions and social pathologies
arising from the fragility of the Nigerian state is the erosion of the country’s credibility
both at home and abroad. Sadly, these stark realities are not taken into account by the
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leaders of Nigeria’s re-branding effort, leaving the project grappling with symptoms
rather than the root cause of the disease.
CONCLUSION
This article has assessed Nigeria’s re-branding initiative of showcasing the good
and the beautiful while papering over the bad and the ugly, including the more funda-
mental problems of state restructuring. Re-branding in the context of state fragility and
the prebendalization politics of disorder assumes significance in the context of weak
institutions involving a duality of order and disorder that allows formal and informal
structures of governance to coexist. Spoils politics allows transparent governance and
the national image to be sacrificed on the altar of parochial agendas. The value system
is abased and citizens’ morale eroded. Hence, a journalistic blitz directed at image
repair becomes an exercise in futility.
While re-branding is a brilliant policy idea, its formulation, planning, and execution
are totally wrong. As shown by this analysis, re-branding is not a matter of name, image,
logo, and advertisement alone. Countries are judged by what they do, not just what
they say. This article has suggested that dysfunctional states in Africa with colonial
legacies of divide and rule are still serving as a model for development from which
emerging leaders have yet to extricate themselves. This model undermines the state
and its institutions, which results in weak and fragile states. Re-branding without
changing attitudes and values, ensuring law and order, providing welfare and public
infrastructure, and a commitment to democracy and the rule of law amounts to window
dressing and an exercise in self-delusion that is doomed to fail. This has implications
for national development.
Re-branding success will likely be measured by the extent to which the state’s
democratic institutions respond to the “entrepreneurs of violence” to counter impunity
and stem prebendalization politics. State fragility has led to image erosion by inherent
contradictions that amount to self-sabotage which a whitewash style of re-branding
fails to contend with. The social distrust that emerges from state-citizen relations also
fuels these internal contradictions, which undermine the integrity and image of the
country and which even well-intentioned re-branding rather than socio-economic
renaissance has failed to alter. To ensure effective re-branding of Nigeria, a serious
political restructuring and attitudinal change must be crafted by both the government
and the governed. The current inordinate emphasis on private rather than public interests
in state dealings needs to be minimized.
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